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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

TESCO AMERICAN, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appeal No 930762-CA

vs.
I

I I I ',

RICHARD T. LETHER d/b/a
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

MATEMEf*

JURISDICTION

Utah R. App. P. 3, 4 confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this ape ~ ~'

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the parties effect an accord and satisfaction''

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In i nnsidpfinci IN ,ip|if-vil limn "iiimniniy Iiidgment, the Court construes all facts
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, and reviews independently issues of law. Baumgart v. Utah Farm ft, 851 P.2d 647
(Utah 1993); Hill v. Seattle First Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246, (Utah 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The determinative statute for this appeal is UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607, which
provides:
The negotiation of an instrument marked "paid in full," "payment in
full," "full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, or the
negotiation of an instrument accompanied by a statement containing such
words or words of similar meaning, does not establish an accord and
satisfaction which binds the payee or prevents the collection of any
remaining amount owed upon the underlying obligation, unless the payee
personally, or by an officer or employee with actual authority to settle
claims, agrees in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as
full payment of the obligation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richard T. Lether, dba Utah Machine Tool Exchange (Utah Machine), purchased
certain equipment from Calissi Properties, Inc. (Calissi), located in the State of Florida,
for resale to the Plaintiff, Tesco American, Inc. (Tesco). Tesco paid $15,000 for the
equipment to Utah Machine and Utah Machine immediately used those funds to pay
Calissi.
Calissi failed to deliver the equipment to Utah Machine as agreed and Utah
Machine was unable to deliver the equipment to Tesco as promised.
Utah Machine made vigorous efforts to compel Calissi to perform, but was
unsuccessful.
Tesco instructed its attorneys to send a written demand to Utah Machine to refund
the purchase price of $15,000.
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i t?oco sued Utah Machine for breach of contract and nondelivery of the equipment
before the $15,000 had been refunded and before Calissi had delivered the equipment.
i n proximately thirty ckw 's affpr PI lit was filed, Calissi shipped the equipment to Utah
Machine, and within a few days thereafter, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-Judgment
ion.
On or about November 2A

&**

M

ie Court entered an Order dissolving the Pre-

judgment Writ of Replevin ana o, J<. ..
At the hearing, the Cou, i.-

nested that the parties work the matter out and in that spirit,

1 ,A

~h Machine stated in open C o u ^
•^•^p»y. TPSPO'S f.ouirvl riqr • -"

+Uo+ ;+

-

^ ' i l d be willing to refi JI id It le $ 15,000
• *^

$15,000 and the check was delivered

-av-VT--* : i full repay on number 6046 per

to its counsel's office

. ^ v f M-^e

having deposited the c .

esco filed an £r.w-^.ded Complair

Action foiExemplary and :

..-use or

. .. . .. ...geswas

Utah Machine's I W L U M \O\ Summary Judgmo..; ...wL. W . March 16, . ~~~, ..^s
granted by the District Court, on June 25, 1993, and Judgment was entered on i.«iw 11
: dismissed pursuant to stipulation of the parties
"

September

- , Mea us Noiice of Appeal on October 5, 1993, and the
,]

i|in| MI'- in N I T 'nmh n r /(> 1093.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The U u . 1 I'M.MI 'I L "' J i b i n g L-J'L , '
1.

I-

, ..Jisf.i.hJil > > MIL, ease:

On May 27, 1992, Utah Machine purchased certain equipment from Calissi
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for resale to Tesco. (R. 00178)
2.

On May 27, 1992, Utah Machine sold the equipment to Tesco for $15,000.

(R. 00178)
3.

Tesco paid Utah Machine $15,000 for the equipment with its check number

011338, dated May 27, 1992. (R. 00178)
4.

Utah Machine paid Calissi $12,750 for the equipment with its check number

9533, dated May 27, 1992. (R. 00178)
5.

Utah Machine purchased the equipment from Calissi with the understanding

it would be shipped upon receipt of payment in full. (R. 00178)
6.

Calissi failed to perform as agreed in that it did not ship the equipment upon

receipt of payment in full from Utah Machine. (R. 00178)
7.

Utah Machine, through counsel and the Economic Crime Unit of the Attorney

General's Office of the State of Florida, pressed Calissi to perform without success. (R.
00178)
8.

On August 21, 1992, James R. Kruse of the law firm of Kruse, Landa and

Maycock demanded of Utah Machine formally to repay the amount of $15,000 to Tesco,
plus interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from May 27, 1992, to the date
of the payment, together with $200 in attorney's fees, and for costs incurred in connection
with asserting the demand. (R. 00179)
9.

James R. Kruse sent another communication to Utah Machine on August

24, 1992, reiterating Tesco's demand to refund the $15,000 plus interest, attorney's fees
and reimbursement of $622 in air fare for the representative of Tesco to travel to Florida
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to inspect the machine that Utah Machine had agreed to sell to Tesco. (R. 00179)
10.

On September 11, 1992, Utah Machine's attorney, Irene Warr, wrote to

Ellen Maycock suggesting a method by which the $15,000 could be refunded if Utah
Machine could not secure the machine from Calissi. (R. 00179)
11.

On September 16, 1992, Tesco's attorney, Ellen Maycock, wrote to Utah

Machine's attorney, Irene Warr, outlining a method by which Utah Machine could refund
the $15,000, plus interest, attorney's fees, costs and air fare incurred by Tesco to inspect
the machine. (R. 00179)
12.

On or about September 15, 1992, Tesco filed suit against Utah Machine.

(R. 00179)
13.

On or about October 15, 1992, Ray Ciarci of Calissi advised Utah Machine

that the equipment was available and Utah Machine arranged for the machine to be
shipped to Salt Lake City. (R. 00179)
14.

On or about October 27, 1992, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-judgment

Writ of Replevin and took the equipment into its possession. (R. 00180)
15.

On or about November 24, 1992, the Court entered an Order requiring

Tesco to return the equipment to Utah Machine. (R. 00180)
16.

At the hearing on Tesco's Order to Show Cause why its Order for Pre-

judgment Writ of Replevin should not be continued in effect during the pendency of the
action, Utah Machine stated in open court that he would be willing to refund the $15,000
immediately. (R. 00180)
17.

Tesco, through its counsel, Ellen Maycock, instructed Utah Machine to
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deliver the $15,000 check to her office. (R. 00180)
18.

Utah Machine paid the $15,000 with its check number 9825, dated October

30, 1992. (R. 00180)
19.

Utah Machine wrote "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court."

(R.

20.

Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, endorsed the check and deposited

00180)

it. (R. 00180)
21.

After having deposited the check with the restrictive endorsement, Tesco

continued with its lawsuit and filed its First Amended Complaint seeking an award of
compensatory damages of $15,000, for an award of incidental and consequential
damages in an amount to be proven at trial, its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the
prosecution of the action, and for an award of exemplary and punitive damages in an
amount to be determined at trial. (R. 00181)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction as enunciated by the Appellate Courts in
this jurisdiction has not been overturned by the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3607 as Tesco has argued. It is consistent with the decisions to-date. It may have been
implicit in the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, but the statute now makes it clear
that only an officer or employee with authority to settle claims may agree in writing
(endorse a check with restrictive language) to accept the amount stated in the instrument
as full payment of the obligation.
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It is well established that general principles of contract law govern accord and
satisfaction. Under those principles, a written offer may be contained in one or more
documents, such as a check and separate letters. A check with the restrictive language
described in the statute on the face of the instrument and endorsed by someone who has
authority to settle claims is a written offer under present case law and would meet the
requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607.
The policy behind the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is to encourage the
economical and efficient out-of-court settlement of disputes.
Tesco has argued that its subjective intent was not to accept the $15,000 in full
settlement of its claims. However, because Tesco's president had authority to settle
claims and negotiated the check containing the words "payment in full for repayment on
# 6046 per court," its subjective intentions are irrelevant.
Third District Court Judge David S. Young correctly concluded that Utah Machine
had fulfilled all the elements of an accord and satisfaction, which are (a) a bona-fide
dispute over an unliquidated amount; (b) a payment tendered in full settlement of the
entire dispute; and (c) an acceptance of a payment.
ARGUMENT
THE PARTIES EFFECTED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Tesco has tried to persuade this Court that, with the enactment of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70A-3-607, the law of this jurisdiction governing accord and satisfaction has been
overturned (R. 00027).
The law of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction of this and other jurisdictions was
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"canvassed" by the Utah Supreme Court when it decided the case of Estate Landscape
v. Mountain States Telephone, 844 P.2d 332 (Utah 1992). In that case, the court said
that the elements of accord and satisfaction are (i) a bona-fide dispute over an
unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment tendered in full settlement of the entire dispute; and
(iii) an acceptance of a payment. As authority for that proposition, the court cited Marion
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985); Masonry Equipment and Supply
v. Willco Associates, Inc., 735 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In Estate Landscape, the Supreme Court stated that "the question of whether there
was a bona-fide dispute over an unliquidated amount breaks into two elements: First, is
there a bona-fide dispute, and, second, is the amount unliquidated." Id. at 326.
The court cited Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P.2d at 733; Ashton v. Skeen,
85 Utah 489, 496, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah 1935) for that proposition. Id. at 326. The
court further went on to say that "nor must the existence of this dispute be apparent from
the face of the check, provided that the totality of the circumstances makes clear that
such a dispute exists over an unliquidated amount and that the creditor understood that
the debtor was tendering the payment in satisfaction of the entire dispute." Id. at 326,
327. (Supporting case citations omitted.)
Tesco did not argue in the Trial Court that there was no bona-fide dispute between
the parties. The restrictive language appeared on the check itself. Tesco's counsel
raised certain issues in its demand letters to Utah Machine, and the issues raised in
Tesco's First Complaint unmistakably establish a dispute over the amount due.
Tesco did not contest the fact that the amount in dispute was unliquidated. The
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lawsuit pending against Utah Machine raised several issues as to the amount in
controversy. (R. 00138) The undisputed facts in this case indicate that Utah Machine's
claim was unliquidated at the time of the tender of the check and it has therefore
established the first element of accord and satisfaction, which requires a bona-fide dispute
over an unliquidated amount.
The second element of accord and satisfaction, which requires a payment tendered
in full settlement of the entire dispute, was not contested by Tesco. The restrictive
language on the reverse side of the check "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court"
clearly establishes the second element of accord and satisfaction.
The third element of accord and satisfaction is the creditor's acceptance of the
payment.

In this case, Tesco's president was personally involved with the dispute

between the parties from the beginning. He instructed his counsel to send demand letters
to Utah Machine in which counsel stated, "this letter shall constitute formal demand on
you to repay the $15,000 to Tesco American, Inc. plus interest at the rate of 10% per
annum from May 27, 1992 to the date of your payment, together with $200 in attorney's
fees, and for costs incurred in connection with asserting this demand." (R. 00063) He
appeared in court on Tesco's Order to Show Cause Why Its Order For Pre-Judgment Writ
of Replevin Should Not Be Continued In Effect During the Pendency of the Action and
heard Utah Machine's offer to refund the $15,000 in settlement of the case. He signed
an Affidavit in Opposition to Utah Machine's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 00033)
and endorsed the check bearing the restrictive language. (R. 00098)
Tesco has argued that its president, Mr. Brugger, "cashed the $15,000 from Utah
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Machine with the understanding that it constituted a return of its purchase money only.
Tesco did not intend to release Utah Machine from any claims. Tesco and Utah Machine
did not enter into any agreement, written or otherwise, to the effect that the return of the
purchase price was an accord and satisfaction between them." (R. 00023)
In Estate Landscape, Id. 329, 330, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue
as to whether the creditor must subjectively assent to the accord or "whether the
creditor's mere negotiation of a check bearing a restrictive condition suffices to discharge
the obligation." The Utah Court of Appeals, in determining that Mountain Bell's letter to
Estate Landscape did not constitute an accord and satisfaction held:
This letter is entirely unilateral; and there is no indication that Estate
Landscape assented to the letter as an accord; its signature on the check
is not an assent to an accord not found on the face of the check as a
restrictive endorsement, where the party to whom the accord is offered has
expressly rejected the proposed accord, continued the dispute, and filed
litigation to resolve it adversarily in court. 793 P.2d at 419 (Footnote
omitted.)
In essence, therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
because Estate Landscape contested the accord through litigation, it must
have "rejected" the accord proffered by Mountain Bell, we disagree.
As Judge Jackson pointed out in dissent, the majority of the court of
appeals misconstrued the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. As adopted
in this jurisdiction, the doctrine does not require subjective intent to
discharge an obligation, provided the parties' actions give rise to a
reasonable inference that they accepted the altered performance of their
contract. Where, as here, the check is tendered under the condition that
negotiation will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts or intent to negate
the condition.
Both Utah cases and authority from other jurisdictions support this
holding. In Marton, for example, we found that a creditor's negotiation of
a check bearing a restrictive condition constituted an accord and satisfaction
even though the creditor had written "not full payment" beneath the
condition before cashing the check. 706 P.2d at 608. Similarly, the Utah
Court of Appeals found that crossing out the restrictive condition before
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negotiating the check did not avoid an accord and satisfaction. Cove View
Excavating & Constr., 758 P.2 at 478.
In both cases, the creditors' conduct reveals a subjective intent not
to accept the lower payment as full discharge of their claims. However,
because they negotiated the checks, their subjective objections were
irrelevant. Their options were to accept the checks on their debtors' terms
or to refrain from negotiating the checks and seek the entire sums through
the judicial process. (Citations omitted.)
In Estate Landscape, the Supreme Court quoting the New York Court of Appeals,
pointed out that "what is said is overwritten by what is done, and assent is imputed as an
inference of law." Id. 330.
If this case were decided on the case law in this jurisdiction presently in effect, it
is clear that Utah Machine has established all three elements of the defense of accord
and satisfaction.
This case appears to be one of first impression on the issue as to what, if any,
affect, the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 has on the existing case law.
In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court held that "a written offer may be
contained in one or more documents, such as a check and a separate letter." Id. 326.
Under present case law, if the payee endorses a check with a restrictive condition, the
check itself would be a "writing" within the meaning of the statute.
The restrictive endorsement in this case is clearly a written offer to settle the
dispute. William Brugger, president of Tesco, personally endorsed the check and cashed
it, indicating his objective intent to accept the amount of the check as full payment of the
obligation. This fact, coupled with his personal involvement in the dispute from the
beginning, is compelling evidence that his objective intent was to accept the check on
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Utah Machine's terms. If this Court were to decline to characterize the check containing
the words payment in full as a written offer, the holding would be inconsistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's enunciation that a written offer may be contained in one or more
documents.
Tesco argued at the hearing on Utah Machine's Motion for Summary Judgment "if
an instrument is marked 'paid in full' or 'full satisfaction,' or 'payment in full,' or whatever,
it doesn't end the matter. It's got to be a separate written agreement of some kind,
showing that the parties agreed that this was a mutual satisfaction of the underlying
obligation. That is not what happened in this case." (R. 00217)
The statute doesn't require a "separate written agreement." The Utah Supreme
Court has already decided that a "written offer" may be contained in one or more
documents, such as a check and a separate letter.
The statute would address an egregious scenario under which a debtor may send
a check with restrictive language to a lock box of an institution and a clerk or employee
with no authority to settle claims would endorse the check and deposit it. The statute
clearly requires that an officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims must
agree in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full payment of the
obligation.
However, as in this case, if an officer or employee with authority to settle claims
endorses a check with a restrictive condition containing language such as "paid in full,"
"payment in full," "full payment of a claim," or words of similar meaning, the check would
be a "writing" within the meaning of the statute.
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It is axiomatic that, as with any contract, the parties must consent to an accord and
satisfaction. If there was any doubt before, the statute has made it clear that only an
officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims can give the required consent.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-607 has not overturned the existing case law on
accord and satisfaction as Tesco would argue, but may have at least clarified
unequivocally that only an officer or employee with actual authority to settle claims may
agree in writing to accept the amount stated in the instrument as full payment of the
obligation.
CONCLUSION
Utah Machine has established all three elements of the defense of accord and
satisfaction. William Brugger, president of Tesco, had the authority to settle claims and
agreed in writing to accept the check for $15,000 with the restrictive condition as full
payment of the obligation. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's Entry
of Summary Judgment in favor of Utah Machine.
Dated this 3rd day of February, 1994.

ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON

SK

^^-A^

rancis J. Nie Ison
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF
OF APPELLEE to the following, postage prepaid, this 3rd day of February, 1994:
Ellen Maycock
David C. Wright
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034

Francis J. Nielson
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ADDENDUM INDEX

1.

Utah Machine Invoice No. 6046

2.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated July 13,1993

3.

Judgment dated July 13, 1993.

4.

Utah Machine Settlement Check for $15,000 endorsed by Tesco
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EXHIBIT 1

&£5& ^alissi Properties, Inc.

f

t-i-

7«f •> NW <*TH STKfcL J', MlAMi. FLORIDA \MM
TEL (V)5J S92-S000 TAXOO*) 59*-J37l

INVOICE
DATE?

MAY 27, 1992

INVOICE #:

920527E

NAME:
COMPANY:
ADDRESS:
CITY:
STATE:

RICHARD LETHER
UTAH MACHINE TOOL
83 SOUTH NAVAJO STREET
SALT LAKE CITY
UTAH 84104

TEL:
FAX:

801-328-0508
801-328-0613

QUANTlir

1

PRICE

DESCK2PTI,

GEKA 100-5H 5 X 5 HYDRi
S/N: 12834- YEAR 1984} HAS OVERSIZE PUNCH
ATTACHMENT FOR UP TO 4" HOLES; HAS "V" NOTCHERj
DEPTH OF THROAT 11-3/4" TQ 11-7/8V FROM THROAT
TO CENTER LINE} LIST OF TOOLING-••''OVERSIZE
PUNCHING ATTACHMENT FOR DYE BLOCK AND PUNCHING
HOLES, PRESS BRAKE ATTACHMENT FOR BENDING,
NOTCHER GAUGE TABLE, AUTOMATIC LINK GAUGE AND
ONE EXTENSION, SPECIAL CHANNEL BLADES FOR
ALUMINUM EXTRUDED CHANNEL, SPECIAL MULTIPLE
PUNCH FOR PUNCHING MORE THAN ONE HOLE AT A
TIME.
PRICE: FOB SHIPPIN3
*12,750.00
TERMS: CHECK UPON RECEIPT OF INVOICE
ADORERS WHERE GEKA IS LOCATED:
ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION
201 HICKMAN DRIVE
SANFORD, FL 32/71-8201
TEL: 407-32.3-8220
FAX: 407-322-8934

THANK YOU FOR THE COURTESIES EXTENDED TO CPIt
R£F:

CCCOO
WAKf HOUMJ.
Vb* M I I <;;«t n,MIAM», M
«IMMW 17MH AVI NUL MIAMI PL

EXHIBIT 2

JUL 1 3 1993
Francis J. Nielson 2411
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0524
45092

kLc^u or
IN THE TfflRD~e»€UIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
TESCO AMERICAN, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,

:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND

:
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD T. LETHER, dba
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE, :

Civil No. 930902937
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
This cause having come on to be heard on Motion of defendant for summary
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 on the 25th day of June, 1993, at the hour of 9:30
a.m., the Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding; Francis J. Nielson having appeared for
the defendant and David C. Wright having appeared for the plaintiff, and the Court having
considered the defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Richard T. Lether's
Affidavit in support of the Motion, and plaintiffs Memorandum, together with the Affidavit of
William S. Brugger in opposition to the Motion, and having heard oral argument, and having
found there is no genuine of fact, with respect to plaintiffs claims against defendant, to be
1
U i .

i

Civil No. 930902937
Judge David S. Young

submitted to the trial court, and good cause appearing, therefore, now makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 27, 1992, Richard T. Lether, dba Utah Machine Tool Exchange

(Richard) purchased certain equipment from Calissi Properties, Inc. (Calissi) for resale to the
plaintiff, Tesco American, Inc. (Tesco).
2.

On May 27, 1992, Richard sold the equipment to Tesco for $15,000.00.

3.

Tesco paid Richard $15,000.00 for the equipment with his check number

011338, dated May 27, 1992.
4.

Richard paid Calissi $12,750.00 for the equipment with his check number

9533, dated May 27, 1992.
5.

Richard purchased the equipment from Calissi with the understanding it

would be shipped upon receipt of payment in full.
6.

Calissi failed to perform as agreed in that it did not ship the equipment

upon receipt of payment in full from Richard.
7.

Richard, through counsel and the Economic Crime Unit of the Attorney's

General's Office of the State of Florida, pressed Calissi to perform without success.
8.

On August 21, 1992, James R. Kruse of the law firm of Kruse, Landa and

Maycock demanded of Richard formally to repay the amount of $15,000.00 to Tesco, plus

2

C

r~. 4

—! r>

Civil No. 930902937
Judge David S. Young
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from May 27, 1992, to the date of the
payment, together with $200.00 in attorney's fees, and for costs incurred in connection with
asserting the demand.
9.

James R. Kruse sent another communication to Richard on August 24,

1992, reiterating Tesco's demand to refund the $15,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees and
reimbursement of $622.00 in air fare for the representative of Tesco to travel to Florida to
inspect the machine that Richard had agreed to sell to Tesco.
10.

On September 11, 1992, Richard's attorney, Irene Warr, wrote to Ellen

Maycock suggesting a method by which the $15,000.00 could be refunded if Richard could not
secure the machine from Calissi.
11.

On September 16, 1992, Tesco's attorney, Ellen Maycock, wrote to

Richard's attorney, Irene Warr, outlining a method by which Richard could refund the
$15,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees, costs and air fare incurred by Tesco to inspect the
machine.
12.

On or about September 15, 1992, Tesco filed suit against Richard.

13.

On or about October 15, 1992, Ray Ciarci of Calissi advised Richard that

the equipment was available and Richard arranged for the machine to be shipped to Salt Lake
City.
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14.

On or about October 27, 1992, Tesco secured an Order for a Pre-judgment

Writ of Replevin and took the equipment into its possession.
15.

On or about November 24, 1992, the court entered an order requiring

Tesco to return the equipment to Richard.
16.

At the hearing on Tesco's Order to Show Cause why its Order for Pre-

judgment Writ of Replevin should not be continued in effect during the pendency of the action,
Richard stated in open court that he would be willing to refund the $15,000.00 immediately.
17.

Tesco, through its counsel, Ellen Maycock, instructed Richard to deliver

the $15,000.00 check to her office.
18.

Richard paid the $15,000.00 with his check number 9825, dated October

19.

Richard wrote "payment in full repayment on #6046 per court."

20.

Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, endorsed the check and deposited

21.

After having deposited the check with the restrictive endorsement, Tesco

30, 1992.

it.

continued with its lawsuit and filed its First Amended Complaint seeking an award of
compensatory damages of $15,000.00, for an award of incidental and consequential damages in
an amount to be proven at trial, its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of the
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action, and for an award of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined at
trial.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There are no genuine issues of fact relating to the defense of accord and

satisfaction to be submitted to the trial court.
2.

The Court has reviewed the facts in the light most favorable to Tesco, the

non-moving party.
3.

Tesco's subjective intentions reflected in its claims that it cashed the

$15,000.00 check from Richard with the understanding that it constituted a return of its purchase
money only, that it did not intend to release Richard from any claims and that the parties did
not enter into any agreement, written or otherwise, to the effect that the return of the purchase
price was an accord and satisfaction between them, are irrelevant.
4.

Tesco's conduct reflected in the demand letters to Richard for

reimbursement of the $15,000.00, the discussions in open court in which Richard agreed to
refund the entire $15,000.00 purchase price and the endorsement of the $15,000.00 check by
Tesco's president, William S. Brugger, is conclusive proof of acceptance of the accord and
satisfaction by Tesco.
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5.

Richard has established the defense of accord and satisfaction by

demonstrating that there was a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount, that a payment
was tendered by Richard in full settlement of the entire dispute, and that Tesco accepted the
payment.
6.

Richard is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Tesco's First Amended

Complaint against him with prejudice.
6.

Richard is not entitled to summary judgment on his Counterclaim because

there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether a press brake attachment was returned with the rest
of the machine.
DATED this

/ ^ day of Julv. 1993.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 1993, I mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
to the following:
David C. Wright
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Francis J. Nielson 2411
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-0524
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Gmemr-cc FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE THIRD•GffieUfP-COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
TESCO AMERICAN, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD T. LETHER, dba
UTAH MACHINE TOOL EXCHANGE,
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Defendant.
This cause having come on to be heard on Motion of defendant for summary
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 on the 25th day of June, 1993, at the hour of 9:30
a.m., the Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding; Francis J. Nielson having appeared for
the defendant and David C. Wright having appeared for the plaintiff, and the Court having
considered the defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Richard T. Lether's
Affidavit in support of the Motion, and plaintiff's Memorandum, together with the Affidavit of
William S. Brugger in opposition to the Motion, and having heard oral argument, and having
found there is no genuine of fact, with respect to plaintiffs claims against defendant, to be
1
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submitted to the trial court, and the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiffs claims

against defendant is granted.
2.

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint against defendant is hereby dismissed

with prejudice.
3.

The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim

against the plaintiff is denied.
DATED this

I b- day of July, 1993. / ^
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DAVID S
Third District
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